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ABSTRACT
The intention of this thesis is to help a developer formulate
plans for a mid-size office building in downtown Boston in the face
of numerous constraints. It reviews the developer's interest in the
Boston market, the site that it is attempting to assemble and the
physical constraints hampering development of an office building in
this location. It then discusses the problems the developer must
contend with in its dealings with City Hall: restrictive new
downtown development controls to be introduced in the near future,
a municipal preference to see housing on the developer's site, and
ongoing changes in the City's recently enacted "linkage" policy.
The thesis searches for an effective financial and political
strategy that will expedite development of the site. It examines the
returns to the developer from two different size office buildings.
Then, in light of the City's interest in housing for the site, it models
both residential and mixed-use development alternatives. Finally,
on the theory that a linkage payment substantially larger than
required under Boston's official policy might both eliminate
municipal pressure to build housing and also speed the approvals
process, the thesis analyzes how such a payment might affect
returns on the two office development scenarios.
The thesis concludes with the recommendation that a
supplementary linkage payment, in concert with one of the office
development scenarios, is the strategy best suited to this developer
and site. It would have only a modest impact on the developer's
long-term financial returns yet, if carefully structured and
presented, may yield significant political gains.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Assistant Professor of Planning and Real Estate Development
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INTRODUCTION
The intention of this document is to guide a developer in its plans
for a mid-size office building in downtown Boston. The thesis will
examine different scenarios and strategies for development of the site
in light of the current uncertainty facing developers in Boston due to
proposed changes in municipal policy. For the purpose of this
document, the site will remain anonymous. Selected characteristics
have been disguised to preserve the identity and integrity of a project
that may be developed in the near future. The analysis which follows,
however, has not been compromised by these adjustments.
THE DEVELOPMENT ENTITY
Since its formation ten years ago, the development company has
established a national profile through the acquisition and development
of commercial property. Its ownership considers real estate as an
appropriate investment vehicle for funds accumulated through other
business activities. Its investment philosophy is thus primarily one of
seeking long-term capital appreciation. Its current assets are
estimated to be worth $1 billion or more. Several years ago, the
developer made a corporate decision to move into and invest in Boston.
While ownership has a particular affinity for the city itself, the
decision follows an assessment by management of major office
markets in the country and a determination that Boston shows
continued growth potential.
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT
For one of its first ventures in Boston the developer has selected a
site in the heart of downtown Boston in an area that is just beginning
to experience both renovation and new construction. It assumed that
through early and discreet assembly of land in this area it would be
able to realize its objective of substantial long-term capital
appreciation. To date, the developer has acquired approximately half
of one block, consisting of both buildings and vacant land, with the
intention of constructing a medium-sized office building. Preliminary
design concepts for the site have already been explored by a major
architectural firm and the architects who will do the actual design
work have just been selected. The developer envisions a building of
approximately seven stories with street facades generally conforming
to current frontage heights. Depending upon the land ultimately
assembled, between 4 and 6 percent of the net rentable area will be
space created through rehabilitation of existing structures. Given this
still relatively "new" location for a new office building, the developer
is assuming that space will rent for an average of approximately $23
net per square foot and that it will appeal primarily to smaller law,
accounting, public relations, brokerage firms, etc.
THE PROBLEMS TO BE EXPLORED
Magnitude of development. The developer has already
determined through early design exploration that a development
scheme minimally meeting its requirements is possible on currently
owned land. However, the building footprint would be a somewhat
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contorted configuration and the building itself would not be as large
as the developer would like. Thus it is currently attempting to acquire
some, but not all, of the remaining parcels. The issue is to what extent
the additional land will affect the developer's returns. Whether or not
the developer acquires any more of the block, it is almost inevitable
that there will be resistance in some quarters to whatever plan it puts
forward. The block under consideration here boasts a number of
buildings which have been determined to meet criteria for landmark
designation as well as several others deemed architecturally
important.
Municipal objectives for the site. The City of Boston has
informally indicated that the site in question is one of many in
downtown Boston where it would prefer to see residential
development and rehabilitation of existing structures. The issue here
is to what extent the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), as part
of a new vision of downtown, will insist on residential development
on all or part of the site, and to what extent an alternative can be
negotiated by the developer.
"Linkage" contributions. This project will be required to make a
contribution to Boston's linkage fund for the creation or rehabilitation
of low- and moderate-income housing. Since the formal introduction of
this policy in late 1983, linkage contributions totalling over $25
million have been formally announced and another $20 million is
expected over the course of the next year or so. Under linkage
requirements established by an amendment to Boston's Zoning Code,
payments are determined by formula and can easily be predicted by a
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developer. How much this project will contribute, however, is not
clear. The current Administration has recently been seeking
supplementary or "special" payments from the development community
to finance on- and off-site improvements and public amenities, and it
is now contemplating a variety of changes to the formula payment
itself. From the developer's perspective, payment of an additional
"linkage" fee may help whatever proposal it ultimately puts before the
BRA.
ORGANIZATION OF THE DOCUMENT
Part One: The Market and the Site first reviews the Boston
market and why the developer appears to be interested in it. This
segment proceeds to a description of the physical context for the
development and a description of the site, parcel dimensions and
existing buildings. It discusses the acquisition history to date. Data
sources used for this section include a number of recent market
surveys, a report on the site prepared for the developer by
architecture and planning consultants and interviews with the
developer.
Part Two: Municipal Constraints briefly reviews anticipated
changes regarding downtown development policy. It then examines the
implications to the developer of the City's apparent preference for
housing on the site. Materials used include a recent projection by the
Boston Redevelopment Authority of housing demand in Boston, and an
as yet unpublished BRA assessment of downtown housing potential.
Finally it discusses linkage requirements in Boston as they relate to
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this project, as well as changes in linkage policy currently being
considered by the Flynn Administration. It considers both linkage and
supplementary contributions, formally committed or promised, by nine
major development projects underway in downtown Boston. Interviews
with senior City officials and miscellaneous City of Boston documents
concerning linkage are the major sources of information for this
section.
Part Three: Options for the Developer. The intent here is to
outline various options available to the developer, and guide in the
selection of a strategy or strategies that best fulfils the company's
investment objectives. Initially, this section examines what scale of
development is feasible given different land assembly scenarios and
historic preservation concerns and compares returns to the developer.
The data used in this section are drawn from interviews with the
developer, financial assumptions used by the developer, Boston
Landmark Commission records and a building cost analysis furnished
by construction consultants. It also explores implications for the
developer of a residential development and a mixed-use development
in the face of a possible impasse with the BRA. Finally it suggests a
number of conceptual linkage payment alternatives which the
developer might consider in its negotiations with the BRA, and
examines the effect of these on the developer's return on investment.
Summary and Conclusions re-states the problems that confront
the developer in the development of its site and reviews a set of
options available to it. It concludes with a set of recommendations on
how the developer should proceed.
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PART ONE:
THE MARKET AND THE SITE
7
Before deciding to establish a corporate presence in Boston, the
developer undertook a survey of development opportunities and began
limited land acquisitions, including parts of the site under discussion.
Buoyed by its initial successful forays into the Boston market-place, it
purchased a number of existing office buildings, opened a small local
office, expanded its land purchase activity, and began plans for
approximately two million square feet of office space over the next
seven or eight years.
THE BOSTON OFFICE MARKET: THE RECENT EXPERIENCE
The developer's commitment to Boston was based on its
assessment of the city as one of the premier office markets in the U.S.
There is certainly ample evidence to corroborate this view. In a recent
report, Colliers International Property Consultants note that " Boston
has absorbed 2 million square feet per year while completions have
averaged 1.8 million square feet over the last six years. Unlike many
markets, Boston has maintained long run balance of supply and
demand." Leggat, McCall and Werner also note that between 1979 and
1984, there were almost no vacancies in the newer buildings and,
according to them, space has generally been leased within 16 to 24
1. Colliers Off/ce Arket Review, USA. Edition, Win7ter /9.5
Colliers International Property Consultants, Boston, Massachusetts,
1985, p.49.
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months.1 Colliers observes that, while completions of space have
consistently exceeded net absorption since 1981, Boston has been able
to avoid a severe softening in its market by dint of substantial latent
demand for space from law, accounting and financial service firms.
Even though this demand subsided during the 1982 recession, it rallied
once again in early 1984.2
Since the developer's arrival in Boston the downtown market has
maintained its strength vis-'a-vis other metropolitan markets. The
most recent Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) survey
notes that, while the national office vacancy rate reached record highs
in 1984 and early 1985 with the U.S. average at over 16 percent,
Boston continues to rank within the top five major cities, enjoying
relatively low vacancy and high absorption rates.3 The vacancy rate is
estimated to be between 10.6 and 11.5 percent.
MARKET PROGNOSIS
Although the recent office market experience in Boston has been
extremely positive for investors, it is of course upon favorable
forecasts for the future that the developer has based its acquisition
and construction plans. The Leggat forecast is one of continued, if
slightly tempered, optimism for the Boston market. It anticipates
1. "Boston Metropolitan Area Market", in /2eve/opnent Revew and
Outlook /984-1985 Urban Land Institute, Washington, D.C., 1984,
p.157.
2. Colliers, p.49.
3. Market and Occupancy Survey, Spring /985 The Bui I d i ng Owners
and Managers Association of Greater Boston (BOMA). p.2.
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growth in office sector employment which it believes will translate
into demand of 1.3 million square feet annually in the next few years. It
is equally bullish about the market's absorption potential based on the
record of 1983 and 1984.1 The BOMA report asserts that:
"given the brisk leasing activity in the (Downtown Financial
District) today, combined with the fact that the next high-rise
building will not open for another twelve months, we expect to
see the current 1.5 million square feet of vacant space absorbed
at a steady pace and envision an overall vacancy rate this fall
dropping to between 3 and 5 percent".2
This rosy prognosis prompts the survey's authors to predict an increase
in rents beyond those currently being attained by the high-rise
buildings, i.e. between $30 and $60 per square foot. New tower space
projected to come on line by the end of 1986 is expected to command
rents of $35 and up.
There are few notes of pessimism amid the various assessments
of the Boston market. Most observers acknowledge that the expansion in
the supply of office space in Boston has been fueled almost exclusively
by demand within the city from a burgeoning service sector (about 70
percent of the demand stems from financial, law, insurance,
advertising, and consulting firms.) Activities in both the Service and
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) sectors have been able to
expand in part because of the availability of a large "baby boom" labor
pool. With this demographic phenomenon now about to subside, there
1. Urban Land Institute, p.158.
2. BOMA, p.7
10
should be a commensurate decline in the available labor supply. The
effect should be to constrain the growth of the FIRE/Service sectors
even in the face of a strong demand for its "products".
What does this mean for the Boston market? Although the local
development community has realized that vacancy rates will be higher
through the end of the decade than they were during the first half, they
have not, at least publicly, expressed fears that the 2-3 million square
feet of space about to be delivered to the market will remain empty for
long. Perhaps Boston developers assume that an extended office labor
shortage will ultimately lure more women into the workforce or
encourage re-training for those currently employed in other sectors.
Perhaps, though, they are more sanguine about Boston's prospects under
this scenario than they might be about other cities' because, unlike
other regions, Boston and the surrounding area are exporters of selected
service activities, e.g. health care, insurance, and a host of consulting
spin-offs from the many local educational institutions. They
undoubtedly assume that, as long as these activities remain fairly
strong, the city will continue to draw the necessary workforce from
other regions. Similarly, they may feel that, because the City of Boston
has regulated development more than most other urban growth areas and
because there promises to be an even more restrictive set of rules in
the near future, any excess supply that might occur in the next few
years will be steadily absorbed since there will be less competition
arriving on the market in subsequent years.
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THE SITE
The proposed development site is located in downtown Boston
within the Financial District, an area bounded approximately by the
Central Artery to the east and south, Government Center to the north, and
the downtown retail district to the west. (Figure 1.1) Of the areas
highlighted in Figure 1. 1, the BOMA statistics indicate that the Financial
District contains approximately 53 percent of the rentable space in
Downtown Boston, in contrast to the Back Bay with 26 percent, South
Station 9 percent and all other areas each with less than 4 percent. The
BOMA report describes the Financial District as "the most active and
desirable office location in the Boston area. It alone accounts for over
one million square feet of annual office space absorption." I The most
recently recorded vacancy rate was 8.57 percent.
The Financial District is divided into a number of sub-districts. The
sub-district within which the development site lies is just beginning to
renovation and new construction activity. It enjoys a long history of
trade and commerce spanning almost two centuries. Its warehouses were
considered integral to Boston's position as the leading port on the
Eastern Seaboard during the first half of the nineteenth century. As the
nature of Boston commerce shifted over the decades, the primacy of the
district waned and its buildings became functionally obsolescent. Many
of the original structures in the area have been razed. Some have been
renovated for different uses while others have been "mothballed" and
await redevelopment. Although the BRA apparently does not intend to
1. BOMA, p.7.
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assume that the area's history and building heritage will inevitably
halt development within this particular district, it is reasonable to
impose on any new development. In entities such as the Boston
Landmarks Commission, the Massachusetts Historical Commission, the
Boston Preservation Alliance, etc. the city has agencies and
associations anxious to preserve Boston's physical heritage. Having
recently lost a number of battles, these groups are becoming
increasingly hungry for a victory. They will undoubtedly be concerned
with both changes to individual buildings on site and the effect of such
changes on the character of the surrounding area.
The development site is part of a block containing sixteen parcels
which amount to approximately 27,000 square feet (Figure 1.2). There
has been considerable activity at this site for about ten years,
attempts having once been made to assemble it for a hotel. The
developer started its own assembly in 1981 and now holds title to nine
parcels totalling 14,000 square feet, or 52 percent of the entire block.
(See Table 1.1). It has also acquired an entire adjacent block where it
plans to construct a 150,000 square foot office building. This other
project will only be discussed in this document to the extent that it
has a bearing on the linkage issue.
On the site under discussion, the developer has acquired the
following parcels:
* PARCEL *: 7001
This parcel includes a four-story residential and commercial
building. The building has some historic significance but is in
somewhat dilapidated condition. If the developer is obliged to
retain this building, it is assumed that the renovation might first
14
FIGURE 1.2
THE PROPOSED SITE AND CURRENT HOLDINGS
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TABLE 1.1
DIMENSIONS OF PROPOSED SITE AND CURRENT HOLDINOS
Parcel
#7000
*7001
#7002
#7003
#7004
#7005
#7006
#7007
#7008
*7009
#7010
#7011
#7012
#7013
#7014
#70 15
Total s.f.
Percent of Block
Area (s.f)
1,040
800
850
1,083
912
880
1,730
2,897
1,800
1,507
4,023
1,778
945
1,140
4,159
1,290
26,834
100%
Current Holdings
800
850
1,083
912
880
2,897
1,140
4,159
1,290
14,011
52%
involve complete dismantling and then reconstruction. The
developer purchased the property from its owner several years ago
and agreed to lease it under a ninety-day notice arrangement.
0 PARCEL *: 7002
Purchased as part of the same transaction as above, this parcel
consists of a five-story residential and commercial building. As
with the adjoining parcel, this property has historic significance
and is in approximately the same condition, although its facade has
been more radically altered. It will pose the same reconstruction
problems as the parcel above if the developer has to retain it.
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9 PARCEL #: 7003, 7004, 7005
Together these parcels currently serve as a surface parking lot.
* PARCEL *: 7007, 7013, 7015
Currently vacant lots used for surface parking.
* PARCEL *: 7014
Containing a 6-story commercial building in such a state of
disrepair that demolition permits have already been issued to the
developer and the building is about to be razed.
The site contains a number of parcels which the developer does not
own. It has determined to its satisfaction, through preliminary design
exploration, that it could proceed with a development which would fit
around these other buildings. However, this would result in a somewhat
contorted configuration that would not appear to maximize the
investment to date, and may invite aesthetic objections from both
regulatory agencies and architectural critics. Moreover, a floor layout
based on currently-held land would adversely affect marketability of
the new building and the rents it is able to command. Prospective
tenants, even the smaller firms anticipated by the developer, are likely
to be less interested in a building that has both a small floor plate and
oddly-configured space on each floor. Accordingly, the developer would
prefer to acquire a few additional sites if possible and if it makes
sense with respect to its investment objectives.. These sites and the
development scenarios associated with each are discussed in Part
Three of this document.
LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH THE SITE
Apart from determining the extent to which historic preservation
17
concerns will constrain demolition and renovation of selected
buildings, the only other legal issue the developer appears to confront
is that of tenant relocation. It has inherited a total of eight tenants
through its various acquisitions. It is only now just gaining access to
some of the units as part of its pre-demolition and structural survey.
Thus far it has encountered a number of unauthorized sub-leases and a
few threatened lawsuits. It anticipates that most of the tenants will
move of their own volition, that it will prevail before the Rent Equity
Board with respect to the sub-leases, and that in the final analysis it
may have to compensate some with modest relocation benefits. The
developer's main problem with both tenants and owners at this point is
not being able to negotiate with each one individually. This is a very
tight little community and word travels fast. As a result prospective
sellers may hold out for higher prices and tenants for more generous
relocation benefits if they learn how others are being compensated.
18
PART TWO:
MUNICIPAL CONSTRAINTS
19
Undertaking a project in Boston in 1985, a developer faces a level
of difficulty and uncertainty perhaps unmatched anywhere in the United
States save San Francisco. The current mayor campaigned on a platform
which included greater controls on downtown development, greater
clarity with respect to the rules governing the development process
downtown and greater neighborhood sharing in the benefits of
downtown commercial development. Since assuming office, the new
Administration has been attempting to translate campaign rhetoric into
politically acceptable public policy and plans. While the development
community still awaits the final release of a BRA document outlining
the full scope of the City's intentions, there have been indications of
what the City is about to unveil in public statements by Administration
spokespersons, official "leaks" in the press, as well as in the nature
and tone of recent BRA studies and publications.
It is anticipated that Downtown will be divided into various zones
each with different permissible floor area ratios (FAR) and heights for
new development. In every zone new maximum FARs and heights,
substantially lower than those of existing buildings, will prevail.1 The
expectation is that this will effectively slow or halt new development
in the traditional bastions of the Boston high-rise, the Financial
District and the Back Bay, and channel it into selective sections of
1. Powers, John. " Boston's Plan: Build With Caution", 7he Boston 6/obe,
July 22, p.1.
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Downtown which have not seen much activity thus far, i.e. North
Station, South Station and the Essex Street Corridor, (and outlying
areas of the city that have never before seen office development, e.g.
the Dudley Station section of the poor and primarily black Roxbury
neighborhood.) In the Downtown growth areas it is anticipated that
maximum permissible FARs and heights will exceed by a considerable
margin those being contemplated for other zones. In concert with its
new development controls the BRA is also expected to offer FAR
bonuses for housing as well as incentives for mixed-use development
and historic preservation.
While developers await official word regarding City intentions,
they are hastily reviewing whatever plans they have on the drawing
boards in light of probable new restrictions. Once formally introduced,
the Downtown Plan will be debated publicly and is almost certain to
encounter strong and vocal opposition from the real estate community
and some members of the City Council. City officials have also been
indicating that its provisions will take several years to adopt legally
and to implement. What occurs in the interim is not entirely clear at
this point. Will some projects be grandfathered? Will boundaries of
certain zones be re-drawn in the face of strong enough opposition? The
development project under discussion here is as much a victim of this
uncertainty as any other that has yet to receive BRA board approval.
Two issues which are relatively clear and which do have a bearing on
the developer's plans, however, are the BRA's intentions regarding
residential development downtown and the City's linkage policy.
21
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT DOWNTOWN
The City has been giving greater consideration recently to the
creation of more housing opportunities downtown. While it is expected
that this subject will be discussed more fully in the upcoming
Development Plan, it is easy to speculate now on the reasons for the
new focus. There is the traditional urban design rationale which argues
that a city is more "livable", its streets more animated at night, etc. if
residential uses are interspersed among downtown office buildings.
Thus a residential emphasis logically forms part of a coherent and
carefully calculated plan for Downtown. Perhaps the more important
argument, however, is that the housing constructed downtown would
primarily serve the needs of young upwardly-mobile individuals and
couples who work downtown and who prefer to walk to work.
In a city where a dominant theme of the last mayoral election was
the evil wrought by gentrification, encouraging new housing downtown
could be construed as a means of alleviating pressure on the existing
housing stock to which the young upwardly-mobile households have
been moving. Since this administration is very committed to the
problem of housing affordability, it cannot say publicly, of course, that
housing constucted downtown would only be built for the more affluent.
However given current difficulties of producing housing affordable to
low- and moderate-income households without adequate federal
subsidy, any new housing in the city would provide some relief from the
pressure.
After many local observers began to attribute Boston's housing
problems to the downtown office development boom of the early
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1980's, the BRA attempted to project future housing demand in the
city and to isolate that segment of such demand which might be
attributable to future office development. I It is perhaps on the basis of
these projections that the City is now anxious to channel new housing
demand into a new supply Downtown which, as new construction or in
buildings adapted from other uses, would pose little threat of
displacement to existing residents.
The BRA analysis predicts a growth in employment of 52,700 jobs
between 1982 and 1992 in Central Boston, which is coterminous with
"Downtown" (Table 2. 1) Based on current job tenure patterns among
downtown workers (established by a recent survey), the planning
agency assumes that one out of every three new positions will be held
by someone who will reside in Boston. Assuming an average of 1.5
persons per household, the BRA concludes that this translates into a
need for 1,230 new dwelling units on an annual basis, or 12,297 units
during the decade. Again based on job tenure patterns, it forecasts that
41 percent of the new positions, and thus 41 percent of the
office-generated demand for housing, will be held by those defined as
"high-income". Moreover, the BRA also forecasts that additional housing
demand will derive from modest population growth and a continued
decline in household size -- 13,833 units over the next decade, of
which 20 percent will be for high-income residents. Housing stock
replacement need will require another 12,060 units of which 20
percent will be occupied by high-income tenants. In sum, the BRA
1. Boston ' Prospective Deve/pment ano' the L inkage to Housi7g Needs
Boston Revelopment Authority, Boston, Massachusetts, October1983.
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estimates that over the course of the decade there will be a total
demand for new residential units in the city of 38,189, of which
10,221, or 27 percent, will be needed for those of higher income. In
contrast, the BRA notes that between 1980 and 1982 only 1,356 units
were completed and that only 3,022 are currently underway and
scheduled for completion between 1983 and 1986.
With a few recent exceptions such as Jamaica Plain, it has been
the Waterfront, the Back Bay, the South End and other "in-town"
neighborhoods which have enjoyed a surge in popularity among
higher-income professionals. It is not unreasonable to assume
therefore, as the BRA apparently has, that future demand from within
the higher-income group that chooses to reside in Boston can largely be
met in other parts of Downtown, as long as the planning agency
facilitates the appropriate development opportunities.
The BRA recently concluded a very preliminary survey of
residential potential downtown which is not yet ready for public
release. It selected eleven districts to examine and assumed that, once
revitalized or developed, these areas combined would form an almost
continuous residential strip linking Boylston Street and the
TheatreDistrict to the Waterfront. Although it does specifically
discuss the block that the developer is assembling, the real
significance of the survey to the developer is that it signals that the
BRA is serious about promoting housing downtown. This is the type and
scale of research that would usually precede the enactment of a major
new municipal policy.
The entire block within which the developer's site is located was
24
Table 2.1
CALCUAATION OF LONG-TERM HOUSING DEMAND IN BOSTX, 1982-1992
Low Moderate High
I. Erreloyment Downtown I92 1992 Incom Income Incone
1982-1992 289,700 342,400
Change 52,700
Boston Reasidents 35X 18,445 253 343 41X
Households 1.5Erployeeset 12,297
Housing Units 12,297 3,0?4 4,181 5,042
Housing Units Per Yer 1,230
Low Moderate High
2. Population Increase 1980 1990 Income Income Income
Population 562,994* 575,000 *
Household Size 2.40 2.24
Households 218,461 240.982 403 403 203
Vacancy Rate 9.43 5.53
Housing Units 241,193 255,028
onge 13,533 5,533 5,533 2,757
Housing Units Per Yew 1,383
Low Moderate High
3 Replacement Need 1980 Incom Income Incone
Housing Units 241,193 403 403 203
Replacement over the decade 53 12,050 4,624 4,624 2,412
Housing Units Per Yea 1,208
Low Moderate High
4. Total Units Income Incone Incomle
1982-1992
Per Yew
'Group quarters population:
'Group quarters population projected at:
13,431 14,538 10,220
1,343 1,454 1,022
38,189
3,819
39,518
35,200
Source: 'batorts Prospective Development and the Lirikage to Housing Needs",
Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston, Muachuetts, October 1983.
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included in the survey. The survey examined every structure in each of
the eleven districts and rated them according to exterior condition. It
then proceeded to an analysis of each block to determine how many
apartments, assuming 1000 square feet per unit, could be created on
each block through rehabilitation and new construction on vacant lots.
It concluded that there was the potential within the eleven selected
districts downtown to develop a total of 11,280 new housing units
through new construction and rehabilitation. Specifically it suggested
that the development site under discussion here would lend itself to 86
units -- a new structure of approximately 50 dwelling units and 36
units through rehabilitation.
Simply because the BRA included this site in its survey, there is
no reason to believe that the agency will necessarily insist upon
residential development on all or part of it. Rather the BRA has
identified the potential of an entire district and its component blocks
and would undoubtedly be satisfied if it realized some portion of the
potential in each district. The problem for this developer is that it may
be among the first to encounter BRA enthusiasm over its housing plans
in this area. An aggressive planning staff may wish to pursue
residential options for its site whether the developer likes it or not.
Therefore the developer needs to be aware of this possibility and to
understand the implications for its future negotiations with the City.
LINKAGE IN BOSTON
According to Boston's Development Impact Project Regulations,
this project will be required to make a "linkage" payment that will be
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used by the City for the creation or rehabilitation of low- and
moderate-income housing. The inspiration for linkage in Boston came
from San Francisco where the Planning Department introduced its
Office Housing Production Program (OHPP) in 1980, after the
department had demonstrated to its satisfaction that the increase in
downtown office space had contributed to a shortage of affordable
housing near the downtown. Under the program, developers of new or
substantially rehabilitated office buildings larger than 50,000 square
feet are required to contribute to the production or rehabilitation of
housing units. The contribution is determined by a formula that relates
office space to the actual number of housing units to be created or
rehabilitated. Developers can select the nature of their contribution,
undertaking construction themselves, contract for the work with
residential developers or pay into a housing trust fund. I From the
program's inception through early 1985, thirty-six downtown
developments have been subject to the San Francisco linkage
requirement. 2 Total cash contributions equal $23,549,495. In addition,
480 units have been or are about to be constructed and another
twenty-nine are to be rehabilitated by developers themselves.3
"Linkage" came about in Boston in 1983 when, at the urging of
Boston City Councilor Bruce C. Bolling and representatives of numerous
neighborhood-based groups, Mayor Kevin White appointed an advisory
committee to recommend a "linkage" policy for Boston. The rationale
1. Porter, Douglas, ed., Oowntown L ilkaqe4 unpublished manuscript,
Urban Land Institute, Washington, D.C., 1985, p.616-A 22.
2. Ibid, p.616-C 7.
3. Ibid, p.616-C 9
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for linkage in Boston was essentially similar to the argument used in
San Francisco. Boston's office development boom was perceived to be
taking its toll on the city's neighborhoods. New office space was
attracting additional workers, many of whom were electing to reside in
the city. This increased the pressure on Boston's limited housing stock
and was driving up the cost of housing beyond the means of its low- and
moderate-income residents. The actual evidence for this argument,
however, was inconclusive and, at best, anecdotal. Causal relationships
were hard to prove and convincing survey data difficult to assemble.
Nevertheless, enough people, both within the Mayor's advisory group and
in the neighborhoods found the argument sufficiently compelling to
press for linkage, and in late 1983 linkage policy became a reality in
Boston.
Since the introduction of a linkage policy in Boston, other cities
have begun to experiment with the idea including Santa Monica, Seattle,
Miami, Hartford and Chicago. The rationale for linkage, its legal basis,
the method of payment and the purpose to which payments are
ultimately dedicated vary from city to city.
CURRENT LINKAGE REQUIREMENTS
In Boston the linkage policy was incorporated into the Boston
Zoning Code effective December 29, 1983, by way of an amendment (No.
73) entitled "Development Impact Projects." The amendment's stated
purpose is to:
1. Afford review and to regulate large-scale real estate development
projects which create new jobs and attract new workers to the
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city of Boston
2. Increase the availability of low- and moderate-income housing by
requiring developers, as a condition of the grant of deviations
from the Zoning Code or the grant of an amendment to the Zoning
Map, to make a development impact payment to the Neighborhood
Housing Trust or to contribute to the creation of low- and
moderate-income housing.
Projects having a "development impact", and thus required to make a
development impact payment, are those which involve new buildings,
extensions or "substantial rehabilitation" in excess of 100,000 square
feet. In order to obtain a discretionary zoning action, e.g. variance,
conditional use permit, planned development area designation, a
developer of such projects must meet two requirements:
1. Have a Development Impact Project Plan approved by the Boston
Redevelopment Authority.
[This is little different, if at all, from the submission a developer
would ordinarily make to the BRA so that it can undertake reviews
of design, traffic impact, use mix, environmental and community
support.]
2. Agree to payment of a Development Impact Project Exaction. Under
this provision the developer must pay $5 per square foot of gross
floor area // excess of /00,000 square feet In other words the
first 100,000 square feet is exempted from the provision; a
150,000 square foot building would therefore pay $250,000 into -
the Neighborhood Housing Trust. (Accessory parking garage space
is excluded from the calculation of gross floor area.) The
Development Impact Project Exaction can take the form of either:
1) a Housing Payment Exaction payable in twelve equal, annual
installments to a Neighborhood Housing trust (yet to be
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established); or 2) a Housing Creation Exaction, whereby the
developer itself builds housing to be occupied by low- and
moderate-income residents at a cost at least equal to what the
developer would have otherwise contributed to the Neighborhood
Housing Trust.
ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN LINKAGE REQUIREMENTS
The current City Administration has been expressing both
privately and publicly its dissatisfaction with the linkage formula it
inherited and has been indicating that it would like to see a larger
contribution made by the development community and made sooner. It is
expected that a new formula, to be announced as part of a
comprehensive downtown plan, will require payments of $6 per square
foot payable over seven years. Another proposed change in Boston's
linkage policy is for some percentage of developer payments to be
allocated to job-training programs. Since the linkage debate began in
Boston some developers have been arguing that the housing "problem" in
Boston would be better addressed through job training since the issue
was really one of income. The City Administration is now very keen to
endorse the idea, especially as it sees its successful job-training
programs suffering from federal funding cutbacks. Incorporation of a
job-training element into Boston's linkage policy may encounter
problems, however. The linkage provisions of the Zoning Code and the
draft of the Neighborhood Housing Trust would need to be re-drawn.
Some observers believe that if the legal argument linking downtown
development to Boston's housing problems is tenuous at best, a
job-training rationale will be even more difficult to establish.
Under the current formula, a 200,000 square foot development
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would pay $5 per square foot over twelve years or $41,667 per annum.
Under the new scheme a 200,000 square foot development would make
seven annual payments of $85,714. At a discount rate of ten percent,
the new proposal would yield a present value of $459,021 against
$312,297 under the current linkage provision. Depending on one's
perspective, this represents a 47 percent gain in linkage funds to the
City or a 47 percent increase in developer obligations.
SUPPLEMENTARY "SPECIAL' PAYMENTS
During the Kevin White Administration and prior to the adoption of
an official linkage policy in Boston, prospective developers had been
asked to contribute in various ways to the "greater good" of the
community through public improvements and/or the provision of public
amenities on and around their sites. Commitments were sought by the
City Administration regarding the hiring of Boston residents in both
construction and permanent jobs. These promises were exacted where
public funds such as Federal Urban Development Action Grants were
involved, e.g. the $500 million Copley Place retail, hotel and office
complex. Alternatively, special contributions were sought for certain
off-site activities. These seem to have been applied only on urban
renewal sites, with the write-down of land costs being used as the
justification for the special exaction, e.g. Arlington-Hadassah , a
485,000 square foot mixed-use development opposite the Boston Public
Garden. In this case the BRA conducted a competition for the site,
stipulating in its request for proposals that candidates would be
expected to make a payment that would be used for the creation of low-
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and moderate-income housing. The winning submission from the Druker
Company included a commitment of $665,000, which Mayor Kevin White
subsequently pledged to the then-fledgling Boston Housing Partnership,
a new non-profit housing development entity.
Mayor White left office at the end of 1983, just as the linkage
amendment to the Zoning Code became effective. Thus the Flynn
Administration assumed office with a linkage policy in place.
Theoretically at least, there was no longer a need to seek from
developers the kind of contribution promised by the Druker Company on
Arlington-Hadassah. Nevertheless, the BRA, under new, Flynn-appointed
leadership, has elected to continue making such requests of developers
notwithstanding the official linkage policy. Supplementing linkage
formula payments with "special" payments is the current
administration's way of 1) honoring its campaign promise to do more
the neighborhoods; and 2) coping with the substantial decline in
discretionary federal assistance to the City. For instance it has
received commitments of over $1 million from five major current
office developments for a Neighborhood Development Bank which will
be used to underwrite housing and commercial improvements in the
neighborhoods. Other "special" payments have been promised for
educational programs as well as park improvements and maintenance.
THE EXPERIENCE WITH LINKAGE CONTRIBUTIONS
As a reference point, it is useful to review the linkage payments
that have been committed by nine major downtown office developments
as recorded in a recent BRA publication. All of these projects were
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underway during the White Adminstration, prior to the linkage
amendment to the Zoning Code taking effect. However, since they were
each still seeking, and were yet to be granted, deviations from the
Zoning Code, they were required to pay a Development Project Impact
Exaction.
Table 2.2 presents the total payments that will be made by the
nine projects, including special contributions, measured against total
development costs and against gross floor area (total square feet). It is
important to note that the data included here was collected for
inclusion in a BRA document in October 1984.1 Although some of the
figures have changed since then, no attempt has been made to record
every subsequent change. The point is that this data was collected
according to a common set of assumptions and therefore provides a
more standardized basis for comparison.
The process by which supplementary payments are determined is
not easy to characterize, although it does appear that the role of the
developer in such negotiations is more likely to be reactive. According
to well-placed observers, supplementary payments appear to be a
matter discussed behind closed doors with the Director of the BRA. In
such a meeting, the Director might indicate that assistance from the
developer on a particular BRA problem would expedite the developer's
application -- which might otherwise be stalled indefinitely within the
BRA. There is a recent case in point where the developer's part of such
an agreement was revealed. A 11 1 -unit, low- and moderate-income
1. Downtown Projects- OpportunIties For Bostorl Boston
Redevelopment Authority, Boston, Massachusetts, 1984.
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Table 2.2
LINKAGE PAYMENTS ANALYSIS OF NINE MAJOR DOWNTOWN PROJECTS
FORMULA PAYMENTS
99 State Street
Rowes/Foster Wharves
International Place
150 Federal Street
101 Federal Street
One Franklin Place
99 Summer Street
Arlington/Hadassah
500 Boylston Street
LINKAGE PAYMENT
$3,000,000
$2,080,000 *
$7,785,000
$1,930,000 *
$1,920,000
$1,410,000 *
$745,000
$355,000
$6,000,000
LINKA6E/TDC
($ Per $1000)
12.5
13.9
18.8
21.4
19.0
17.6
18.8
4.40
20.8
LINKAGE/TSF'(S per sq. ft.)
5.00
3.68
4.70
4.71
4.74
4.45
4.55
0.92
4.69
FORMULA PLUS
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS
LINKAGE/TDC LINKAGE/TSF'
($ per $1000) ($ per sq. ft.)
13.1 5.25
13.9 3.68
19.8 5.26
24.8 5.44
22.0 5.49
20.8 5.24
22.6 5.46
22.1 4.59
22.5 5.08
TOTAL /AVERAGE $25,225,000 14.97 4.16 20.2 5.05
* First 100,000 square feet exempted from linkage payment calculation. Need to adjust flurther for parking to arrive
* $5 per square foot.
* Numbers have since changed: Rowes/Foster- $1.710 m.; 150 Federal - $2.625 m.; One Franklin Place - $1.375 m.
Assuming that the new numbers reflect smaller or larger projects, the analysis should not change.
Source: "DOWNTOWN PROJECTS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR BOSTON", Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston, Ma, 1984.
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housing development in the Roxbury neighborhood, in the planning
stages for over a year, has apparently just been made financially
feasible because the Lincoln Property Company, developer of the One
Franklin Place office building, has "voluntarily contributed $700,000".1
No mention was made, of course, of what the developer received in
return but it is reasonable to assume that the donation was not made
without a qu/dpro quo. In fact, according to one source, Boston public
officials have openly admitted that the Boston linkage system does
"contain a qu/d pro quo: in return for housing and other contributions
determined by the development agreement, project processing is
expedited so that approvals come much faster than for other
projects."2
It is not clear whether the practice of seeking additional
contributions will cease if and when a revised linkage policy is
established. If supplementary payments were construed by the Flynn
Administration as a means of correcting a flawed (i.e. not
sufficiently aggressive) "linkage" policy., then the new proposal should
theoretically eliminate the need for supplementary payments beyond
the formula. A comparison between linkage contributions made under
the current scheme and those that would be required under the revised
formula makes this point. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that the
linkage formula payments of all nine projects in Table 2.2 begin at the
same time, the $25,225,000 in total would yield twelve combined
annual payments of $2,102, 100, a present value of $15,755,368 when
1. Yudis, Anthony J.,"Tempers flare over new N. End buildings", T/e
Boston 6/obe August 9, 1985, p. 19.
2. Porter, p.616-A 22.
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discounted at ten percent. The Flynn Administration's revised formula,
as proposed, would generate an additional $6,481,170 for a total of
$31,706,170. Assuming seven annual payments of $4,529,453
discounted at ten percent, this would mean a present value of
$24,256,402 or a 54 percent increase over the current linkage yield.
The special payments associated with the nine projects presented in
Table 2.2 amount to $3,365,000, with a present value of approximately
$3,000,000. This figure is substantially smaller, however, than the
extra $8,501,034 that would be generated by the proposed formula
revisions.
It may turn out that the new formula may simply become the new
"ffloor" and further contributions still sought in return for greater
density, etc. Howeverthere is another more compelling, political,
argument to suggest that supplementary payments will still be sought
by the City. Linkage formula funds will by law go into the Neighborhood
Housing Trust. The Trust has still to be established and its board is
supposed to have broad-based membership appointed by the Mayor and
City Council. This inevitably means that funds will be disbursed across
the city, running counter to both conventional planning wisdom about
targeting limited funds and the Flynn Administration's preference for
total discretion over the money. In fact the Mayor vetoed the proposed
Neighborhood Housing Trust Ordinance in October 1984 because the
City Council preferred specific standards regarding the allocation of
linkage resources and the eligibility of beneficiaries. In this context
therefore, supplementary payments from developers, outside the formal
linkage administrative framework, would obviously be welcomed by the
Administration.
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PART THREE:
OPTIONS FOR THE DEVELOPER
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The developer's intention is to construct a medium-size office
building on the site for long-term ownership. It envisions that likely
tenants will be smaller professional firms seeking first-class office
space, willing to accept smaller building floors and a non-high-rise
address for a lower rent in a good location. It has acquired most of the
site it needs to achieve its objectives and it would now like, and
believes it will be able to, acquire up to four additional parcels on the
site. Aware of impending City restrictions regarding development in
this area and mindful, too, of the preservationist lobby, it has tempered
the scale of its planned development. Depending on the site ultimately
assembled as well as pressure from City Hall and preservationists, it
is prepared to build a 120,000 to 145,000 square feet primarily infill
structure incorporating some renovated space into the overall design
scheme.
At this point the developer is faced with several questions
regarding how to proceed in its negotiations with the City:
If the City exerts pressure for residential development on some or
all of the site, would it be worthwhile to consider a residential
option? How do the returns compare on a 100 percent residential
development or on a mixed-use project with those it anticipates
receiving under either of two office development scenarios with
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which it feels comfortable? Would the company be able to handle
a residential development and future management of units?
e How would a higher linkage payment affect both the City's
disposition toward the site and the developer's returns? Would
such a payment be an acceptable alternative to the City instead of
housing on site? What form might such payments take?
This section first reviews the two office scenarios that the
developer is currently contemplating and examines its returns
assuming sale in the tenth year. It then examines residential and
mixed-use variants for the site. Finally it explores ways in which the
developer might enhance its position through offers of alternative
"linkage" payments.
TWO OFFICE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS
The site currently assembled, as noted earlier, lends itself to a
development of modest scale which the developer believes would work
physically. However it believes that, in the long term, the acquisition
of at least one additional parcel would improve the return on its
investment. Table 3.1 details the two different land assembly
scenarios which the developer is entertaining.
A 16,000 square foot site would accommodate a 120,000 square
foot building with a floor area ratio (FAR) of 7.5. To construct this
building the developer would have to acquire Parcel*: 7008, which
contains a 5-story commercial building currently in estate
proceedings. The beneficiary has agreed to sell to the developer and at
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Table 3.1
TWO OFFICE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS
Land Area
(Square Feet)
1,040
800
850
1,083
912
880
1,730
2,897
1,800
1,507
4,023
1,778
945
1,140
4,159
1,290
26,834
Current Developer
Holdings
800
850
1,083
912
880
2,897
1,140
4,159
1,290
14,011
120,000 s.f.
Scenario
880
850
1,083
912
880
2,897
1,800
1,140
4,159
1,290
15,891
145,000 sf.
Scenario
1,040
880
850
1,083
912
880
2,897
1,800
1,507
945
1,140
4,159
1,290
19,383
Percent of Block 100%
Progress toward this scenario
Parcel
#7000
#7001
#7002
#7003
#7004
#7005
#7006
#7007
#7008
#7009
#7010
#7011
#7012
#7013
#7014
#7015
Total s.f.
52X 59%
88%
72%
72%
an estimated price of $1,000,000. The building itself has no historic or
other significance and there should be little or no resistance to its
demolition.
The acquisition of three additional parcels would increase the
buildable site to 19,000 square feet and permit a structure of 145,000
square feet (FAR of 7.63). Parcel#'s: 7000, 7009, 7012 are owned by an
individual with substantial property holdings in the area who, if and
when she decides to sell, will drive a hard bargain. A price of $2
million is considered very likely. The first parcel contains a 4-story
commercial and residential structure which has been nominated as a
Boston Landmark. There is no question that this building, although in
somewhat dilapidated condition, will remain intact if the parcel is
acquired. It would offer approximately 5000 rentable square feet.
Parcel *7009 contains a 5-story commercial structure. Although the
developer would prefer to demolish this building, it is in good condition
and its retention might even help the development. A very small
addition above the fifth floor would establish a higher roof line and a
larger new building than might otherwise be possible. Parcel *7012 is
currently a vacant lot.
Since there has yet to be any formal encounter with the
Landmarks Commission, the Massachusetts Historical Commission or
the Preservation Alliance, etc. and there is still no official indication
as to how the BRA will address historic preservation, it is only
possible to speculate on what the developer will face on this matter.
The landmark status of some buildings on the site will at a minimum
impose height and facade restrictions, and, at a maximum, prevent the
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efficient configuring of interior space. But perhaps more important
than the constraints imposed by individual buildings, however, is what
urban designers refer to as the tout ensemble, where the whole is
considered to be greater than its component parts. In other words
changes on the site may be construed as having an adverse effect on the
integrity of the physical fabric and scale of the larger surrounding
area. The developer is thus contemplating a structure which will
complement the existing structures both on and off site. The two
possible development scenarios assume FARs of 7.5 and 7.63, although
the current Zoning Code authorizes an FAR of 10 in this district.
Office Development Assumptions
Appendices A and B present how each of the two development
schemes would work financially, using the developer's assumptions
regarding timing, gross and net rent, construction costs, indirect costs,
financing costs, etc. The operating pro formas are somewhat simplified
and not intended to be fully comprehensive as to detail. The intent is
to provide a framework for comparison of the schemes, based on
common assumptions, and with the various alternatives to be discussed
later.
* Regardless of the size of the project, the developer envisions a
structure with brick skin, belled caissons to approximately 20 feet
below grade, one basement, and substantial renovation (essentially
new construction) of between two and four existing buildings. An
average of $62.00 per square foot has been assumed for building
shell costs based on a construction consultant's analysis.
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9 The proposed scheme makes no provision for parking although the
developer will make space available to tenants at a nearby lot which
it owns.
* Both schemes assume 55 percent lease up in the first year, 20
percent pre-leased space, three months tenant finish out (with the
finish out occurring in the construction year for the pre-leased
space) and three months free rent for 80 percent of the space.
9 The scenarios differ in land costs -- $183.44 per surface square
foot in the 120,000 square foot scenario as against $259.74 for the
larger building.
& Construction financing assumes a 12.5 percent interest rate. A two-
part take-down of this loan by permanent financing is also assumed.
The permanent loan will have a rate of 12.5 percent interest only for
the first five years and thereafter will amortize on a 30-year
schedule at a 12.81 percent constant.
e The 120,000 square foot scheme will include 5,200 square feet of
renovated space eligible for a federal Investment Tax Credit. The
larger building includes 9,000 square feet of renovated space.
e Both scenarios assume the Administration's proposed new
mandatory linkage contribution contribution of $6 per square foot
payable over seven years. Since there appears to be no definitive
conclusion on the handling of this payment for tax purposes, i.e.
whether the entire payment is deducted in the year made or
amortized over a number of years, an assumption has been made here
to amortize the annual expense over five years.
43
Office Development Returns
Table 3.2 summarizes the returns to the developer of the two
office scenarios. It is clear that both alternatives offer the developer
excellent returns on its investment. In Year 2, the first stabilized year,
the 120,000 square foot development promises a 13.1 percent return on
total project costs and a 30.83 percent cash-on-cash return. The
145,000 square foot building promises a 12.56 percent return on total
project costs and a 13.01 percent cash-on-cash return. Both scenarios
would provide the developer with a strong stream of tax-shelter
benefits through Year 6 which it could apply against income on other,
out-of-town holdings. More important, however, are the discounted
returns, since the developer is particularly interested in long-term
appreciation of its investments. Assuming sale at the end of the tenth
year, the net present value of the 145,000 square foot scenario is
$418,000 higher than that of the smaller building, but the differences
between the two are more clearly demonstrated by the internal rate of
return and the profitability index (which explicitly takes into account
the equity investment). With a substantially lower equity investment of
$544,412 the 120,000 square foot building can look to a profitability
index of 1 1.35 and an IRR of 64.99 percent. The larger development has
an index of 2.7 and and an IRR of 32.26 percent. The difference lies with
the significantly larger, by 450 percent, equity investment.
The differential in equity happens to be almost the exact amount
that the developer would have to pay for the additional land needed for
the larger building. On the surface this raises questions about the
wisdom of acquiring the additional land -- increasing the site size by
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Table 3.2
OFFICE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS: COMPARISON OF RETURNS
120,000 s. f. 145,000 s. f.
PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS & COSTS
Site size (per square foot)
Land Cost (per surface square foot)
Net rentable Area (square feet)
Land Cost (per rentable square foot)
Net Rent (per rentable square foot)
Project Cost
Cost per rentable square foot
16,000
$183.44
100,000
$31.69
$23.00
$16,544,412
$165.44
19,000
$259.74
125,000
$41.66
$23.00
$21,441,014
$171.53
RETURN MEASURES
Net Operating Income (Stabilized Year)
Initial Return on Total Prolect
Equity Required
Cash Flow After Debt Service
Initial Return on Equity
Initial Value @ 10%
Capitalization of NOI
Initial Projected Value In
Excess of Debt
Sales Price (10% cap on 11th year NOl)
$2,167,857
13.10%
$544,412
$167,857
30.83%
$21 ,678,570
$5,678,570
$34,130,022
$2,692,679
12.56%
$2,441,014
$317,679
13.01%
$26,926,790
$7,926,790
$42,662,528
Increase in Value
(Sales Price-Project Costs)
Project Costs
Net Present Value 012% (After Tax)
Profitability Index
(Net Present Value/Initial Equity)
Internal Rate of Return
$6,178,177 $6,596,209
11.35 2.70
64.99% 32.26%
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Scenario
106.29% 98.98%
almost 19 percent will increase the overall cost of land by more than
64 percent. Considering the developer's intention of becoming a force in
the Boston marketplace, it may justify the larger building because it
makes a more visible impact. And of course it would still receive a
solid return on investment given the assumptions it has made.
Nevertheless this does not appear to be a fully satisfactory
justification for the larger building. The developer could just as easily
signal its arrival in the Boston marketplace another way. It could make
an equal or larger impact in the city, and earn a better return overall, if
it used the $2 million additional equity required by the 145,000 square
foot building as its investment in another project. There are perhaps
stronger arguments for the developer acquiring the additional parcels.
First, it would gain control of most of the site, thereby eliminating the
future possibility of "conflicting" or blighting uses on these parcels.
Second, the larger site would create a less disjointed building
footprint which would appeal to larger tenants. Of course, if the
purchase price for the additional parcels substantially exceeds the
current estimate of $2 million, the developer will have to re-assess
the 145,000 square foot scenario.
A RESIDENTIAL OPTION FOR THE SITE
If the City were to exert pressure on the developer to consider
construction of a residential building on the site, the developer needs
to know the implications of such an undertaking. A residential option
for the site is shown in Appendix C, assuming a 120,000 square foot
structure and the same FAR as the similar size office building. Other
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assumptions include:
9 Since the developer is most interested in long-term appreciation,
the units will be rental and not condominiums for sale.
e A per square foot construction cost of $70 is used, an estimate
which includes construction of both the shell and interior finish.
o An average monthly gross rent of $2,500, escalating at 6 percent
per annum, for an average 1000 square feet apartment. Rents will be
adjusted annually.
* Substantially higher operating costs than the office building.
* A vacancy factor of 3 percent is used after Year 1 -- this is
relatively low but can be justified by the tightness of the Boston
housing market.
e The same linkage assumptions are made as in the office building.
This is a conservative assumption because there is conflicting
opinion as to whether a linkage payment would be required in a case
such as this. The linkage amendment to the Zoning Code stipulates
that market-rate residential development which results in the
elimination of low- and moderate-income housing must pay a
linkage fee. How this will be interpreted in practice, however, has
yet to be seen. Some observers feel that the fee would only be
required if low- and moderate-income units were replaced by an
equivalent number of market-rate units and, in this particular case,
it could be argued that the social benefits of creating one hundred
market-rate units outweigh the costs of displacing the handful of
existing tenants.
* The same proportion of space will be renovated as the office
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building, generating the same ITC benefits as in the office scenario.
Although the developer would enjoy a positive cash flow from the
outset, the NPV at just over $2 million is not even one-third of the NPV
in either office scenario (Table 3.3). The IRR at 17.06 percent is also
substantially less than either office case. The key difference is that
the residential option has a lower NOI and is able to carry less debt
even with the coverage ratio of 1. 15 used here. Although total project
costs are $2 million less, the equity requirement is $4.5 million, $4
million more than in the 120,000 square foot office building. The NOI is
able to support a loan of $10.1 million as compared with $16 million in
the office scenario.
If rents of $2,500 per month are possible in an area that has still
to be tested as a residential market, the returns from this residential
scenario might be acceptable to a housing developer, especially after
syndication. To this developer, however, the returns in no way compare
to those of an office building, and as long as the FAR is held to 7.5,
even increasing the site to 19,000 square feet would not significantly
improve returns on the residential option, given the effect of the higher
land cost discussed earlier in the comparison of office buildings.
Not only do the returns not appear to justify the investment
in the residential scenario in light of the much more favorable office
option, the developer would be faced with a problem it has not
encountered before. It has had no experience with the construction and
management of residential units. If it were disposed to the
construction of condominiums, once the sales transactions were
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Table 3.3
OFFICE, RESIDENTIAL AND MIXED-USE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS: COMPARISON OF RETURNS ON I 20,000 GROSS SF. BUILDING
Scenario OFFICE RESIDENTIAL MIXED-USE
PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS 8 COSTS
Site size (per square toot) 16,000 16,000 16,000
Land Cost (per surface square foot) $183.44 $183.44 1163.44
Net rentable Area (square feet) 100,000 100,000 100,000
Land Cost (per rentable square toot) $31.69 $31.69 $31.69
Net Rent (per rentable square toot) $23.00 for office space ; $2500 per month per unit for residential space
Project Cost $16,544,412 $14,605,295 $15,747,239
Cost per rentable square foot $165.44 $146.05 $157.47
RETURN MEASURES
Net Operating Income (Stabilized Year)
Initial Return on Total Project
Equity Required
Cash Flow After Debt Service
initial Return on Equity
initial Value e I 0X
Capitalization of NOI
initial Projected Value In
Excess of Debt
Sales Price (I0 cap on 11 th year NOI)
increase in Value
(Sales Price-Project Costs)
Project Costs
Net Present Value 01 2X (After Tax)
Profitability Index
(Net Present Value/Initial Equity)
$2,167,857
13.1 0X
$544,412
$167,857
30.83X
$21,A78,570
$5,678,570
$34,130,022
106.29X
$6,178,177
11.35
$1,453,242
9.95fl
$4,495,785
$189,553
4.22X
$14,532,420
$4,422,910
$25,358,948
73.63X
$2,016,476
0.45
$1,953,473
1241X
$2,147,239
$253,473
11.80k
$19,534,730
$5,934,730
$31,498,700
100.03X
$4,875,712
227
17.06X 29.97XInternal Rate of Return 64.99X
complete and a condominium association established, its involvement
would be concluded. In the case of rental apartments, however, even
with a management agent in place, it would have the responsibility for
one hundred tenants as contrasted with an estimated fifteen
commercial tenants. And tenants of these housing units would turn over
every two or three years against every five in the office building.
Therefore, in light of the markedly lower returns that the apartment
building would bring, it is very difficult to imagine this developer
seriously considering accepting the more burdensome management
responsibilities.
If the City is serious in its desire to promote housing downtown,
it will have to permit substantially greater FAR's, i.e. offer FAR
bonuses which will both reduce the per rentable square foot land cost
and facilitate certain economies of scale, or formally designate
specific downtown parcels as residential-use only. (This latter
approach would, of course, undoubtedly have the effect of reducing
property values for some landowners and launch a series of lawsuits).
Alternatively, the City could also consider assembling land and writing
down its cost to prospective residential developers. Otherwise, if this
particular site is representative of residential developments, the City
is going to have difficulty realizing its Downtown housing goals.
A MIXED-USE OPTION FOR THE SITE
One alternative for the developer to consider in its negotiations
with the BRA is essentially a compromise solution. Combining both
office and residential uses on the site may satisfy the City's goals and
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improve the developer's returns over the residential-only option.
Appendix D presents a mixed-use scenario that uses the same 120,000
square foot building that has been the basis for comparison thus far. It
assumes that net rentable area would be allocated 70 percent to
offices and the remainder to thirty apartments of 1000 square feet
each. This would mean that approximately two upper floors of the
building would be devoted to apartments. Assumptions from the
office-only and residential-only alternatives (Appendices A and C
respectively) are combined in the mixed-use pro forma, e.g. the office
vacancy rate of 5 percent is used for the 70,000 square feet of
commercial space and the 3 percent rate is used for the residential
units.
Table 3.3 compares the mixed-use building with the office and
residential alternatives. As conceived here, the mixed-use project is
clearly an improvement over the residential building but, as one would
expect, fails to offer the developer returns close to the office-only
scenario. Enjoying a positive cash flow from the outset and a strong
stream of tax shelter benefits through Year 6, the developer's
investment in this scenario would offer an NPV of almost $4.9 million,
against $2 million for the residential building and $6.2 million under
the office scenario. On an equity investment of $2, 147,239 the
developer would realize returns, as measured by the profitability index
and the internal rate of return, of 2.27 and 29.97 percent respectively
-- considerably less than the office building and much more than the
apartment building. Again the key factor is the debt-carrying limitation
imposed by net operating income and the cost of money projected at
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12.5 percent.. The mixed-use scenario calls for an equity investment
equivalent to almost half the outlay required by the residential
building but four times larger than that needed by the office building.
The mixed-use scenario as construed here therefore offers the
developer a compromise solution if the City is insistent upon the
inclusion of some residential units on the site. While, by every
measure, the returns are not nearly as favorable as those in the
office-only scenario, given the additional equity requirement of $1.6
million, they are certainly far superior to those promised by a 100-unit
apartment building. The question still remains, however, as to whether
the developer wishes to become a builder and owner of residential
units.
Although the operating dimensions of the residential "problem"
would be less under a mixed-use scenario, many of the same
management disincentives would apply. Therefore it is reasonable for
the developer to look to another alternative for use in its negotiations
with the City. Accordingly, the next section discusses linkage options
which the developer might explore as trade-offs for BRA approval.
LINKAGE AND THIS PROJECT
Under the potential scenarios outlined earlier, the two different
building footprints would yield office building sizes of 120,000 or
145,000 square feet. The pro formas for these buildings were developed
using the proposed new linkage payment of $6 per foot payable over
seven years. This is the amount and schedule that the developer should
now assume in all its calculations. Table 3.4 demonstrates the effect
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Table 3.4
COMPARISON OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED LINKAGE FORMULA PAYMENTS BY PROJECT SIZE
PROJECT SIZE
(s.f.)
120,000
145,000
AMA SUBJECT
TO LINKAGE
20,000
45,000
TOTAL PMT.
OLD FORMULA"
$100,000
$225,000
ANNUAL
PMT.""
$8.333
$18,750
PRESENT
VALUE"""
$56,781
$127,757
TOTAL PMT.
NEW FORMULA'
$120,000
$270,000
" $5 per square foot. * $6 per square foot.
""Twelve annual payments. " Seven annual payments.
Discounted at 10 percent, end of year convention.
(U1
ANNUAL
PMT."
$17,143
$38,571
PRESENT
VALUE"""
$83,459
$187,782
that changing the linkage formula has had on this project. By increasing
the payment from $5 per square foot and accelerating the payment
schedule, the City will have increased the developer's expenses by 47
percent. However, the linkage contribution, when included in the
operating pro forma, treated as an operating expense spread out over
time and its tax-shelter effects are accounted for, can be seen to have
ultimately only a modest impact on the developer's returns. Table 3.5
isolates the effect of linkage on the pro formas for the two different
office buildings, showing what the developer's returns would have been
if it were not required to pay a linkage fee.
SUPPLEMENTARY LINKAGE AND THIS PROJECT
It is easy to construe that inclusion of housing on all or part of the
site might eliminate BRA objections to commercial development on the
remainder and also obviate the need for any additional linkage payment.
However, as was shown in Table 3.3., housing cannot be included on the
site unless the developer is prepared to accept less than optimal
returns and, equally important, assume the headaches associated with
ownership of residential units. On the premise that the developer will
resist at all costs the inclusion of apartments on its site, it is
reasonable to expect that it can enhance its bargaining position with
the City by being prepared to exceed the mandatory linkage payments in
the case of either the 120,000 or the 145,000 square foot office
buildings. It is also reasonable to expect that if the developer is
ultimately left with no choice but to include residential units on the
site, no supplementary linkage payment should even be contemplated.
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Table 3.5
TWO OFFICE DEVELOPMENT SCBARIOS: THE EFFECT OF LINKAGE
Scenario 120,000 s.f. 120,000sf. 145,000 s f. 145,000 s. f.
Without Unkage WithUnkage Without Linkage With Linkage
PROECT CHARACTERISTICS& COSTS
Site size (per sware foot) 16,000 16,000 19,000 19,000
Land Cost (per surface square foot) $183.44 $163.44 $259.74 $259.74
Net rentable Ares (square feet) 100,000 100,000 125,000 125,000
Land Cost (per rentable square foot) $31.69 831.69 $41.66 $41.66
Net Rent (per rentable square foot) $23.00 $23.00 $23.00 $23.00
Project Cost $16,544,412 $16,544,412 $21,441,014 $21,441,014
Cost per rentable sqare foot $165.44 $165.44 $17153 $171.53
Net Operating income (Stabilized Year)
Initial Return on Total Project
Equity Required
Caah Flow After Debt Service
Initial Return on Equity
Initial Value * 10
Captalizationof NOI
Initial Projected Value In
Excess of Debt
Salee Price (0l capon I1th yearNOI)
Increse in Value
(Sales Price-Project Costs)
Project Costs
Net Present Value 412X (After Tax)
Profitability Index
(Net Present Vau/initial Eqiity)
12,185,000
13.21X
$544,412
$185,000
33.98
$21,850,000
$5850,000
$34,130,022
106.29
$6,185,144
11.36
$2,167,657
13.103
544,412
$167,857
30.633
$21,678,570
$5,78,570
$34,130,022
106.29
$6,178,177
11.35
$2,731,250
12743
$2,441,014
$356,250
14.59X
$27,312,500
S8,312,500
$42A62,S28
$2,92,679
12565
$2,441,014
1317,679
13.013
$26,926,790
$7,926,790
$462$28
9&983
$6A,11,685
2.71
91983
$696,20
2.70
65.29X 64.99X
U1
U1
Internal Rate of Return 32.38X 32.25X
If it turns out that the City does not coerce the developer to include
residential units on the site, there is still good reason for the
developer to consider supplementary linkage payments. The developer
has held this land with minimal return for a number of years and now
feels compelled to "fast track" the project. Some payment or
contribution in excess of the minimum required by the formula may
advance its project on the City's list of priorities. Total linkage
payments (mandatory plus voluntary) could essentially be trade-offs
for the easing of BRA restrictions with respect to density in the area.
Assuming that the new Downtown Development Policy about to be
released will require several years to win public consensus and then
final enactment, it must also be assumed that interim procedures and
restrictions will have some degree of flexibility until "codified".
In order to have any impact in negotiations the City, it is assumed
that any linkage alternative proposed by the developer should be at
least as generous (proportionately) as linkage payments committed to
date on developments requiring BRA approval, whether measured by
total development costs or gross building area. Furthermore it is
recommended that the developer should propose the specific nature of
a supplementary payment during negotiations with the City. The
advantage of this tactic would be that the developer could identify in
advance the kind of activity with which it might wish to have a special
association rather than simply funding an Administration pet project.
There may be considerable political kudos attached to sponsoring the
right project.
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SUPPLEMENTARY LINKAGE PAYMENT METHODS
There are probably countless ways that a supplementary linkage
amount might be determined. There is no attempt here to recommend a
specific dollar amount nor a precise method for determining one. That
is ultimately a decision for the developer and a function of its latest
financing assumptions as well as the tenor and progress of its
negotiations with the BRA. Rather the following alternatives are
suggested as ways in which the developer might approach the
supplementary payment decision.
1. Percent of Total Development Costs.
Under this option, presented in Table 3.6, the total linkage
payment (including the mandatory payment) would be equivalent to 3
percent of total development costs (TDC). This option is based on the
assumption that linkage contributions made by the development should
exceed by a clear margin the average linkage payment for the group of
nine downtown office buildings summarized in Table 2.2 -- 2 percent of
total development costs. Moreover, a 3 percent contribution would be
even more generous than the 2.5 percent of TDC for the 150 Federal
Street project, the highest proportionate payment recorded for any
single development. Another argument for tying the linkage payment to
total development costs is that if it were based on square footage, $8,
$9, $10 etc. per square foot could conceivably become a new standard
for the City to impose on the development community at large. Tying
the payment to TDC at least gives the developer some control over the
denominator in its own linkage formula -- it can limit its costs if it
chooses.
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Table 3.6
LINKAGE OPTION 1: 3% TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COSTS.
ANNUAL
PROJECT SIZE TOTAL DEVELOP- 3% TDC MANDATORY SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENT PRESENT
(Square Feet) MENT COST* PAYMENT** PAYMENT' PAYMENT" (7 YEARS) VALUE'" t
120,000 $16,544,412 $496,332 $120,000 $376,332 $70,905 $345,193
145,000 $21,441,041 $643,231 $270,000 $373,231 $91,890 $447,360
*Based on an estimate of $ 165.44 per rentable square foot for the 120,000 s.f building and $ 171.53
for the 145,000 s.f. building.
This is higher than the highest overall linkage rate being paid by any current development.
$6 per square foot. t" 39 TDC payment minus mandatory formula payment.
"' Discounted at 10 percent, end-of-year convention.
U1
00
Total payment under this option would be either $496,000 on the
120,000 square foot building and $643,000 on the larger building.
Annual payments on the 120,000 square foot and the 145,000 square
foot buildings would be $71,000 and $92,000 respectively. Table 3.7
summarizes the effect of the increased payment on the developer's
returns under each scenario. It can be seen that the effect of the larger
payment on the developer's returns is still modest when considered
from a ten-year perspective -- changes in NPV and IRR are minimal
regardless of scenario. The most notable change is, of course, on initial
cash flow and the cash-on-cash return. However, given the developer's
emphasis on long-term appreciation, this is really only a problem in
Year 1 and will require a marginal increase in the developer's equity
investment. Alternatively the developer could schedule the start of the
additional payments to coincide with adequate cash flow.
2. Sliding-Scale.
A sliding-scale approach would essentially work like a
traditional zoning mechanism whereby cities offer height and FAR
bonuses to developers in return for some qu/d'pro quo from the
developer. In this case the developer would be proposing to the City
that it be allowed to build on the site to a greater FAR than the BRA is
likely to permit under its new plan for Downtown. Marginal percentage
increases in payments, tied to a TDC or square footage base, would be
offered for each marginal increase in building size. The problem here is
that the BRA may not be inclined to deviate from its new plan by
awarding FAR bonuses simply in return for higher linkage payments,
although there may be some room for this approach before the plan is
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Table 3.7
THE EFFECT OF 3 PERCENT TDC UNKAGE PAYMENTS
Scerrio 120,000 sf. 120,000 sf. 145,000 a f. 145,000 s. f.
Mandstory Lirkage 33 1DC Mlandatory Llnkge 3X TDC
PROECT CHARACTERISTICS & COSTS
Site size (per square foot) 16,000 16,000 19,000 19,000
Project Cost $16,544,412 $16,544,412 $21,441,014 $21,441,014
AnAl Llrage Payment 117,143 $70,905 38,5?1 91,890
RETURN MEASURES
Net Operating Income (Stabilized Year) $2,165,000 52,114,095 $2,731,250 $2,639,360
Initial Return on Total Project 13.21X 12.78X 12.743 12.31X
C Equity Required $544,412 $544,412 $2,441,014 52,441,014
o CahFlow After Debt Service $185,000 $114,095 $356,250 $264,360
Initial Return on Equity 33.983 20.963 14.593 10.633
Initial Valuee 10 $21A850,000 $21,140,950 $27,312,500 $26,393,600
Capitalization of NOI
Initial Projected Value 55A50,000 $5,140,950 $8,312,500 $7,393,600
Excess of Debt
Sales Price (10O cap on I Ith yew NOI) $34,130,022 $34,130,022 $42,662,528 $4262,526
Increase In Value (Soles Price-Project Costs) 106.2M 106.293 965 989
Project Costs
Net Present Value 012X $6,178,177 $6,156,327 $6,595,209 $6#574,539
Profitability Index (Net Present Value/inItial Equity) 1135 1131 2.710 2.69
Internal Rate of Return 64.99X 64.043 32.265 32.09X
fully and legally implemented. Moreover, if the BRA were disposed
toward such a bonus in order to realize its Downtown housing
objectives, this still might be an alternative for the developer to
consider. If the BRA would increase the FAR on the site from the
current assumption of 7.5, the residential option might become more
palatable. Unfortunately the developer would still be in the somewhat
undesirable position of owning and managing residential units and
might want to explore other linkage alternatives.
3. Housing "Substitution" Payment.
Since the housing "problem" in Boston is fundamentally one of
income and the affordability of housing to low- and moderate-income
residents, the developer might propose to underwrite the cost of
creating or rehabilitating housing for this segment of the population.
This approach would be especially useful in the event that discussions
with the City turn on the residential issue, but it might work equally to
the developer's advantage if a housing "substitution" payment
accelerated the approvals process or increased the FAR on the site.
Assuming that the City urged the developer to include thirty
residential units on its Downtown site, the developer could agree to
subsidize the construction of thirty off-site units instead. With a per
unit subsidy of $20,000 the developer would make a supplementary
contribution of $600,000 in addition to the $120,000 mandatory
payment; a $25,000 per unit subsidy would cost the developer $750,000
in addition to the formula payment. With a similar proportion of the
145,000 square foot building potentially devoted to housing, a housing
"substitution" payment would amount to $750,000 in addition to the
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formula linkage payment, assuming a $20,000 per unit subsidy;
$937,500 with a $25,000 subsidy. Payments would be made over a
seven-year period and it is assumed that the City (or some other
entity) would be able to borrow against this projected revenue stream
in order to build the housing sooner. Table 3.8 presents a summary of
the effects of such contributions on the returns of the two buildings.
As in the case where payments are tied to total development costs, the
effect here is to reduce very marginally the developer's long-term
returns as measured by the NPV and IRR. This applies to both building
sizes and subsidy levels. The only real effect is on the early cash flow
stream, which should not be of primary concern in light of the
developer's investment objectives.
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Table 3.8
THE EFFECT OF "HO1SN6 SUBSTITUTIOW'PAYMENTS.
Scenario 120,000 af. 120,000 af. 120,000 a. 145,000 a f. 145,000 s f. 145,000 a f.
Mfndstory virkage Plus $20 K/ Plus $25 K/ Mnidatory Urkage Plus $20 K/ Plus $25 K/
Unit Sesidy Unit Susidy Unit Susidy Unit Sbsidy
PROJCT CHARACTERIS7CS; & COSTS
Sitense (per square foot) 16,000 16,000 16,000 19,000 19,000 19,000
Project Cost $16,544,412 $16544,412 $10544,412 $21,441,014 $21,441,014 $21,441,014
Annual Lnirkge Payment $17,143 $102,657 $124,286 $38,51 $145,714 $172,500
RETRN MEASLRES
Net Operating Income (Stabilized Year)
Initial Return on Total Project
Equity Required
Cash Flow After Debt Service
Initial Return on Equity
Initial Value w 103
Capitalization of NOI
initial Projected Value In
Excess of Debt
Sales Price (10 cap on I1 th year NO)
increase in Value (Sales Price-Project Costa)
Project Costs
Net Present Value *12X
Profitability Index (Net Present Value/Initial Equity)
$2,185,000
13.213
$544,412
$185,000
33.98X
$2,082,143
12.593
$544,412
$82,143
15.095
$2,000,714
12.46X
$544,412
$00,714
11.153
$21 A50,000 $20A21,430 $20A07,140
85A50,000
$34,130,022
106.29X
$6,178,177
11.35
$4,821,430 $4p607,140
$34,130,022 $34,130,022
106.29X
$6,143,340
I1.26
10029X
$6,134.631
11.27
32.25 31.93X 31.85X
a'
$2,731,250
12.74X
$2,441,014
$356,250
14.5911
$27,312,500
$8r312,500
$42A62,526
9&96
$2,55,535
12.063
$2,441,014
$210,535
&62
125155,350
$6A55,300
$42,62,526
9&96
$6,552,663
$2,558,750
11.933
62,441,014
$183,750
7.53X
$25,57,500
$6#87,500
H2,62,528
96.981
$6541,776
2.082.70 2.66
63.48X 611 Iinternal Rate of Retumn 64.90X
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
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The intent of this document has been to outline options for a
development site in downtown Boston. The developer must make a
decision about the most appropriate use of its site and then formulate
a strategy that will help realize its objective. The developer has an
opportunity to purchase additional parcels of land that will enhance
acquisitions made to date and permit construction of of a larger
building than is currently possible, but is constrained in development
of any building, however, because of the cloud of uncertainty currently
hovering over all downtown development. The City is about to announce
fairly radical changes in policy toward the development of Downtown,
with potentially major ramifications for the developer's site.
This section reviews the options available to the developer and
concludes with a recommendation that a supplementary linkage
payment is an effective and desirable strategy for achieving
development goals.
Which Office Scenario?
The previous section explored the the implications of the
developer's assumptions regarding additional land acquisitions,
timing, financing and construction costs, rents, etc. for the
development of two different office scenarios. It concluded that
construction of a 120,000 square foot building on a 16,000 square foot
site offered the developer substantially superior returns than a
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building of 145,000 square feet on a 19,000 square foot site.
Essentially, the $2 million projected cost of the additional land would
require a commensurate increase in the developer's equity investment.
However, it was argued that, for several reasons, the developer would
still probably opt for the larger site and building. First, the currently
owned parcels are less than ideal in the floor plate configuration they
offer. Second, failure of the developer to control the additional sites
would only leave it vulnerable to "undesirable" abutting uses in the
future.
Can The Developer Cope with New FAR Restrictions?
The site is located in a district which has considerable history and
a number of historic buildings. Indeed several of the parcels the
developer has already acquired contain structures which have been
designated landmarks. The City, via the BRA, is expected to introduce
new development policies rooted in sensitivity to Boston's historic
buildings which will drastically restrict the scale of any new
construction in the district.
In response, the developer has assumed in its financial projections
that it will be required to rehabilitate most of the existing
structures. The developer has also scaled back its construction plans
for the site. However, even its assumption that an FAR of 7.5 will be
acceptable to the BRA may be tenuous. The City's new Downtown
restrictions may reduce the FAR further, perhaps to 6.5. The
developer may still be able to conform with prevailing bulk standards
by opening the basement to commercial use or building to a floor
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height of 10 feet 6 inches rather than the more conventional 12 feet.
It might also be able to secure BRA approval of the legal concept of
transferred development rights. This land-use and zoning technique,
hitherto unused in Boston, may suddenly be of considerable interest to
developers whose options are circumscribed by contiguity or
concentration of designated landmark properties.
A Residential or Mixed-Use Development?
Assuming that the developer is able to surmount any down-zoning,
it is faced with the problem of how to cope with the prospect of the
City pressing for housing on the site. The returns for a fully
residential project as modelled in Appendix C are certainly not worth
this developer's attention, but the returns on the mixed-use option
presented in Appendix D are substantially better. Nevertheless even
the improvement offered by the mixed-use alternative compares
poorly with either office building scenario and still presents the
developer with the prospect of having to build and manage housing for
the first time.
A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE SITE
Another developer might look differently at this same site -- a
residential developer might want to do housing on this site, despite
the land cost. Nevertheless, it is recommended that this developer
pursue an office development for the site, building whichever scenario
it ultimately considers makes the most sense. It is also recommended
that the developer agree to make a supplementary linkage contribution
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of the type suggested in Part Three. Summary Table 4. 1 presents all
the alternatives discussed in Part Three using the 120,000 building as
a basis of comparison. In contrast to either the residential or mixed-
use scenarios, the supplementary linkage approach, however
formulated, offers the developer very similar returns over the long
term to net gains projected for both office buildings when only the
mandatory amount is paid.
Despite an official linkage policy in Boston, with a clearly
defined formula tying payment to building square footage, the Flynn
Administration has begun to realize that it can also extract
supplementary payments from developers. As long as the office market
in Boston is strong, it does not appear that even these supplementary
linkage payments will kill the "golden" goose. In a different
development climate, however, developers may be reluctant to make
even the payments required by Boston's linkage policy, never mind the
kind of supplementary contribution made by the One Franklin Place
office development on behalf of the Roxbury residential project.
Boston's linkage policy, even when revised as planned, does not
significantly change the negotiations a developer has with City Hall.
The costs are known and are part of the price of entry that a developer
understands. Supplementary payments are another matter, however,
and largely uncharted territory. In late 1984 all but one of the
projects listed in Table 2.2 had agreed to payments beyond the formula
requirement, typically adding between $0.40 and $.90 per square foot
to the mandatory linkage payment. Since then, other agreements have
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Table 4.1
THREE DEVELOPMENT AND THREE LINKAGE SCENARIOS: OMPARISON OF RETURNS ON A 120,000 S.F. BUILDING
OFFICE/3X OFFICE/520K OFFICE/S25K
Scenario OFFICE RESIDENTIAL MIXED-USE TOC LINKAGE HSG. SUSIDY HSG. SUSIDY
PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS & COSTS
Site size (per square toot) 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000
Project Cost $16,544,412 $14,605,295 Si 5,747,239 $16,544,412 $16,544,412 $16,544,412
Annual Linkage Payment $17,413 $17,413 $17,413 $70,905 $102,657 $124,280
RETURN MEASURES
Net Operating Incom...
Initial Return on Total Project
Equity Required
Cash Flow After Debt Service
Initial Return on Equity
Initial Value 0 1 0X
Capitalization of NOI
Initial Projected Value In
Excess of Debt
Sales Price (0 cap on I Ith yew NOI)
Increase in Value
(Sales Price-Project Costs)
Project Costs
Net Present Value e 1 2X (After Tax)
Profitability Index
(Net Present Value/initial Equity)
$2,107,857
131I0%
$544,412
$107,857
30.83%
$21,#78,570
15}578,570
$34,130,022
106.29X
$6,178,177
1135
$1,453,242
9.95X
$4,495,785
$189,553
4.22X
$14,532,420
$4,422,910
125,358,948
73.63X
$2,016,476
0.45
$1,953,473
12.41X
$2,147,239
$253,473
11 .80%
$19,534,730
$5,934,730
$31,498,700
100.03X
$4,875,712
227
$2,114,095
1278X
$544,412
$114,095
20.96X
$21,140,950
$5,140,950
$34,130,022
1 0.29X
$6,156,327
1131
$2,082,143
12593
$544,412
$82,143
15.09%
$20,821,430
$4,821,430
$34,130,022
106.29X
$6,143,340
$2,060,714
12.46
$544,412
$60,714
11.153
$20,607,140
$4,607,140
$34,130,022
106.299
$6,134,631
S1.28
64.04X 63.48X 63.119
I 1.27
Internal Rate of Return 17.061% 29.97X
been struck such as the one with One Franklin Place which has further
increased that project's per square foot contribution. There are a
number of benefits to a developer in agreeing to make a supplementary
payment. It almost guarantees that a project will not go unnoticed,
thereby ensuring that it will advance on the City's list of priorities.
Moreover, a supplementary payment provides this developer with a
strong "in lieu" rationale, so that it is not forced by the BRA to pursue
less attractive residential or mixed-use options.
If, for some reason, the developer still has some misgivings about
linkage in Boston or about the supplementary payments suggested here,
it is perhaps useful to consider the payments from several other
perspectives:
The Linkage Burden will be Borne by the Tenant.
It was assumed by Mayor White's Linkage Advisory Committee in
1983 that any linkage payment would be passed through to the tenant.
In the 120,000 square foot building, the annual linkage payment under
the new $6 per square foot, seven-year schedule proposal would
amount to $17,143. With a net rentable area of 100,000 square feet,
this would amount to an increase of $0.17 per square foot on an annual
rent of $30.00. In the case of the 145,000 scenario, a larger payment
is required since 45,000 square feet is subject to the linkage formula.
Here an annual payment of $38,571 and a net rentable area of 125,000
square feet translate into a $0.31 increase in per square foot rent. In
neither case does it appear that potential tenants for this site would
be deterred by such small marginal increases.
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The Effect of the 100,000 Square Foot Exemption
The mandatory linkage payment is not especially burdensome to
tenants in the office scenarios that have been reviewed because the
100,000 square foot exemption has a significant effect in the case of
smaller buildings. In a larger development the rental impact would be
more acute. For example, tenants in a 400,000 square foot structure,
with a similar ratio of net rentable to gross building area as the
145,000 square foot building, would face a $0.75 increase; in an
800,000 square foot building, tenants would pay an additional $0.87.
Without the 100,000 square foot exemption, the annual per square foot
rent increase in the 120,000 square foot building would be $1.03; in
the 145,000 scenario, it would be $0.99 (this is slightly less than the
smaller building because of different assumptions about net rentable
area).
The alternative linkage payment methods presented in Part Three
negate the effect of the 100,000 exemption, since none of the
suggestions is tied to a square footage base. Therefore, in the case of
the 120,000 square foot building, a linkage payment based on 3 percent
of total development costs would amount to a rent increase of $0.71
per square foot. With the housing "substitution" options, the rent
increase would be $ 1.03 for the $20,000 subsidy and $1.24 for the
$25,000 subsidy. What this means for the developer is that, because it
is developing a smaller site where the 100,000 square foot exemption
is worth more, it can more easily afford to make a supplementary
payment. Such a payment will increase tenant rents by little more than
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is caused by the mandatory payment alone on larger buildings.
When larger developments commit to supplementary payments, the
marginal increase in rents will be even greater for those buildings. To
the extent that this developer's building will compete with larger
office developments, it may therefore have a competitive marketing
advantage. Even with supplementary linkage payments, the 100,000
square foot exemption will enable the developer to charge marginally
lower rents. Obviously, the developer will still have to assess whether
the market will allow it to pass along the entire linkage contribution,
mandatory and supplementary, to the tenant. At least initially, there
may have to be some sharing of costs.
It Could Be Worse
Under the new Downtown development plan, it has been suggested
that new buildings exceeding 300 feet may have to pay the linkage
contribution up front on the floors above 300 feet. In other words, a
450-foot tall building with a 25,000 square foot floor plate and 12.5
foot stories would pay the regular linkage fee on the first 24 floors
(minus the 100,000 square foot exemption). This would amount to $3
million or $429,000 annually for seven years. On the twelve floors
which exceed 300 feet, the developer would have to pay $1,800,000 in
a single payment up front. Whether this payment would occur at
issuance of the building permit or at the end of construction is not
clear, but in either event a lump sum payment clearly has serious
financial ramifications for a developer. It would have to capitalize the
cost rather than treat it as an operating expense as the current annual
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installment payment method permits.
Another way of putting the Boston linkage requirements into
perspective for this developer is to consider briefly what its
counterpart in San Francisco must face. The San Francisco payment is
a single front-end payment averaging approximately $4.00 per square
foot of office space. This cost would either have to be absorbed by the
developer or financed. Moreover, in San Francisco payment of a linkage
fee is not accompanied by concessions in application procedures as
appears to be the case in Boston. The San Francisco developer can
either build housing units or pay an "in lieu" fee that is determined
through negotiation with the planning staff, on a case-by-case basis. 1
At least mandatory linkage payments in Boston are predictable and
theoretically less subject to abuse. (Although if supplementary
payments do become the norm over the long term, then the Boston
situation may more closely resemble San Francisco.) Finally, the San
Francisco developer is about to be charged linkage fees for purposes
other than just housing. Already paying a mass transit linkage fee in
addition to the housing exaction, it can also look forward to a new
child care linkage fee as well as a mandatory set-aside of one percent
of total development costs for art work on site once the new San
Francisco Downtown Plan takes effect.2
1. Porter, pp. 616-A 3 & 616-A 4.
2. Lindsey, Robert., "Buildings Curbed By San Francisco", New York
Times, July 3, 1985.
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DEDICATION OF SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS
Although the limited evidence to date suggests that the idea for
supplementary payments has come from the BRA, the recommendation
here has been that this developer take the initiative. In order to seize
the initiative fully, however, the developer should have in mind how
its supplementary linkage payments might be allocated. Some
attention to this issue may yield additional gains for the developer.
There are a variety of purposes to which supplementary payments,
however determined, might be dedicated and this situation suggests
several in particular:
* A contribution specifically for housing to which the BRA can readily
point as an acceptable substitute for housing on site. Given the
City's interest in targeting, one option would be to dedicate funds to
a particular population group that has some identification with
downtown, e.g. the homeless people whose needs are variously met
by an assortment of organizations. Another example would be the
Asian community, whose Chinatown neighborhood is more typically
threatened by the development plans of others.
9 A job-training element would sit well with the Administration. As
noted earlier, it is now feeling some pressure to find alternative
funding sources for its current programs and the proposed linkage
revisions to include job training may not withstand the initial legal
tests.
* Direct developer involvement in some off-site "affordable" housing
development. The Mayor campaigned on a housing platform and he
has still to deliver housing units in any substantial numbers. The
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prospect of a developer prepared to build affordable housing,
probably in concert with a local non-profit development entity,
would undoubtedly be well received by the City Administration right
now. One of the advantages of this approach is that Mayor's office
staff could probably be counted upon to usher the developer's
downtown office project through the various permit and approval
agencies at City Hall, not least the BRA. This is exactly the kind of
help the developer could use at this stage.
Bearing in mind that the developer is relatively new to Boston, has
only a small staff, and has no track record in housing, it is not
reasonable to expect that its management could cope easily with a
complicated relationship involving a non-profit organization. However,
it would behoove the developer to commit its housing funds to a body
such as the Boston Housing Partnership and/or its job-training funds
to the Private Industry Council. The rationale for such an approach is
threefold: 1) It achieves a degree of visibility for its funds since the
activities of both organizations receive considerable attention within
government, the neighborhoods and the business community; 2) The
developer will not have to concern itself any further with the
allocated funds, for they will be efficiently and effectively utilized
by these organizations; and 3) It may also serve to enlist the support
for its development plans from the prominent business and
government leaders who sit on the boards of such organizations.
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APPOVIX A
120,000 SOJARE FEET BUILDING: DEVELOPMENT PRO FORMA
E)HI18T 1: GENERAL INFORMATION ANO ASSIPTIONS
COMSTRLCTION FINANCING
Land
6ross Building Ares
Floor Are Ratio
Net Rentable Area
Useable Are
Parking Stalls
COST ASSUl9TIONS
MARKET RENT
16,000
120.000
7.5
100.000
90,000
0
Amount
Rate
Term (Months)
Ave. Outstanding
PERMANNT FINACING
Landt per surface s.f)
Building Shell (per gross s.f.)
Parking
Tenant Finish (per rentable e.)
Greas Rent
Operating Expens
Net Rent
Monthly Parking Rent
$183.44
S62JDO
NA
$14.A7
Amount
Amortization
Mtg. Constant
Annus Debt Servioe
*nterest only for first 5 years;
30-year oaortization therafter
012.81 constant
$30.00
$7.00
$23J00
NA
SPACE
$12,500,000
12503
12
443
12503
$2,000,000
APPENDIX A
EIIBIT 2: UES AM SRMCES CFFUNDS
ConSL Yr. Yewl
TOTAL COST COST PER U.
(Rentable)
Lead PWMe Coat ($183.44/0r)
Land Title inurance
Land Development (0emolition)
TOTAL LAN COST
Building & iprovement Coste
Buiding Shell S 2.00 per af.
Tenant Finish e 114.87 per s.f.
Other Construction Costa
Constrction Contingency 03X
TOTAL BULOiG & IMPROVEiN COST
indirect Costs Before Financing
AM
Feastbity Studes
Advertilng
LessngCosts
Legal & Acaonting
TItle inurence
Reel Estte Tense
Develope's Fees
Financing Fees
Seor /Adintistrative
Rent ConcessioneVecant (er. Expenes
Sener contingency
TOTAL lINIRECT COSTS
Construction interest 125X
TOTAL CONSTRITI(N IRTEEST
TOTAL PROJECT COSTS
Permanent Financing
Equity
2,935,040$13,409$220,000
, $3,168,509
17,440,000$297,400
9440,000
223200
18,400,000 $1,109,000
15000
$15,000
19,00
$115,000
$152,000
16000
$70.000
2X
11 $172,556
S18,000
2X $324,403
11,87,460 11,43?,503
695,312
6955312
$13,851$881 2,62,551
$13;07,469
44,412
$13,851,881 $2,692,551
YEAR
USES
s0
$1,189,600
$20,100
400,000
138,000
1324,403
$2935
10.13
1220
$31.9
174.40
11487$4.40$223
$2,935,040
113,469
$220,000
13,168,509
17,440,0
S1,467,00
"40,000
S223,200
19590,200
1650,000
$15,000
130,000
575,000
$70,000
324,403$172,558
118,000
595,00
$324,403
13p24,903
?00,740
700,740
$16544,412
TOTAL
$16p00,000
44,412
S16.44,412
1650
80.15
1030
15.75$1.90
S0*1
10.70
1324
$1.73
10.18
15.95
1324
13025
17A1
17*1
$105.44
SOLIRCES
105,428
$65,426
$202,551
TOT AL
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APPENDIX B:
Office Scenario: 145,000 Square Feet
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APPENIX 5
145,000 SQUARE FEET BUILDING: DEYELOPMENT PRO FORMA
EXHIBIT 1: GENERAL INFORMATION AND ASSrPTIONS
COMSTRUCTION FINANCING
Land
Gross Building Area
Floor Area Ratio
Net Rentable Area
Useable Ares
Parking Stalls
COST ASSUMPTIONS
19,000
145,000
?.63
125,000
112.000
0
Amount
Rate
Term (Months)
Ave. Outstanding
PERMANENT FINANCING
Land per surface s.f)
Building Shell (per gross s.f.)
Parking
Tenant Finish (per rentable s.f.)
MARKET RENT
Gross Rent
Operating Expense
Net Rent
Monthly Parking Rent
S259.74
$52.00
NA
$14.80
Arnt
Amortization
Mtge. Constant
Annu1 Debt Service,
$19,000,000
12.50$2,375,000
*Interest only for first 5 years
30-year amortization therafter
v12A1 constant
30.00
$7.00
12300
NA
SPACE
00
11.
$15,000,000
1 2.50
12
44X
APPEN)IX 5
E)4iBIT 2: USES MN SOURCES OFFUS
YEAR
Land
Land Purcae Cost (125974/af)
Land Title nuuoe
Lundw Dvlopment (Demolition)
TOTAL LAND COST
Bilding imrovement Costs:
building "9l.102.00 per s.f.
Tenent FInish e $1487 per at.
Other Constrction Cosa
Construction Contingency n
TOTAL 0LOING & IMPfRO1VEENT COST
Indirect Cost Before Financhi
ASE
Feasibilty Studlee
Advertising
Lesing Costs
Legal & Accounting
Title Inmwunce
Red Estate Tuom
Deveiope's Fees
Fin n IFese
Sener l/Administrmuve
Rent ConceesiVecnt Oper. Epeneus
General Contngency
TOTAL IIRECT COSTS
Construction interest 12131
TOTAL CONSTRUCTIN INTEREST
TOTAL PROJCT COSTS
Const Yr.
04,935,000
122,49
6250,000
5,207,529
$6,990,000
570,000
575,000$209,700
YwI
s0
$1,480,000
TOTAL COST COST PER SF.
(Rentae)
$4,935,050
122,469
8250,000
S5,207,5209
$6,990,000
liA50,000
1375,000
6260,700
$11,484,700$10,04,700 $1,480,000
$740,000
12,000
$13,200
$160,000
6200,000
9,600
100,000
2X
13 322,630
20,000
23 $420,415
$25,000
.40,000
0.000
1420,415
?45,7504
11,952,045 11,80005
$834,375
s0
$11,400
$61,400
S17,994,640 $3,442,365 s0
1740,000
12,000
140,000
"00,000
1250,000
100,800
160,000
1420,415
223,60
120,000
6743,750
1420,415
10 $3,833,011
0915,775
915,775
10 $21,441,014
Pernnewnt Financing
Eq7ity
TOTAL
$15,57,635
$2,441,014
$3,442,365 $19,000,000
$2,441,014
$17,996,649 $3,442,365
USES
(A
$39.46
90.16
12.00
141.6
S71.92
53.00
191 J6
15.92
.20
0.32
15.40
$2.00
00
I004
5336
$1.79
10.16
5.95
6336
143.6
6733
6733
$17153
TOTAL
821,441,014
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APPENDIX C:
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APPENDIX C
120,000 S0UARE FEET RESIDENTIAL BUlLDING: DEVELOPMENT PRO FORMA
EXHIBIT 1: GENERAL INFORMATION AND ASSWMPTIONS
CONSTRXTION FINANCING
Land (sf)
Gross Building Area (s.f.)
Floor Area Ratio
Not Rentable Area (s.f)
Residential Units ()
Average unit size (s.f.)
COST ASSUIPTIONS;
16.000
120.000
7.5
100,000
100
1,000
Amount
Rate
Term (Months)
Ave. Outstanding
PERMANENT FINANCING
Land per surface sf)
Construction Costs (per gross s.f.)
Parking
Monthly Gross Rent (per unit)
Monthly Operating Expense
as Percentage of Net Revenue
Monthly Parking Rent
Amount
Amortization
Mtge. Constant
Annuel Debt Service
$183.44
$70.00
NA
$2,500.00
49Q0
NA
110,109,510
1250%
t ,263.689
*Interest only for first 5 years;
30-year amortization therufter
*12.81 constant
N Source: Institute of Real Estate Menagement, "income
Expense Analysis, Apartments, Boston, kiurnished
Elevator Buildings, 1982.
SPACE
$6,941.000
1250S
12
44X
MARKET RENT
qw
APPEND( C
EXHSIT 2: USES AND SOURCES OF FUMS
YEAR Const. Yr.
Lund
Land Pundhas Cost ($183.44/.f)
Land Title inmunce
Land Developeent (Demolition)
TOTAL LAN COST
Building & Inrovemnnt Cost:
Building Hll 9 $?0.00 per at.
Oter Construcon Costs
Constrction Contingency 93X
TOTAL BSNLDINS & IM9ROVE'ENT COST
Indirect Costs Before Financi
A&E
Fessibility Studes
Advertising
Lessing Costs
Legal & AouoWting
Title Inura
Reel EstateTxes
Dwoloper Fees
FinanclngFeee
General/AniinIstrative
General Contingcy
TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS
Construction Interest 9 125X
TOTAL CONMSTRUCTION INTEREST
TOTAL PRJECT COSTS
Penwnnt Firncing
Equity
TOTAL
$29O40
$13,469$220,000
$3,168,509
$8,40000$440,000
$252,000
$9,092,000
1550,000
$15,000
W40000
S152,000
800,599$70,000
2X
13 $152,333
$18,000
2 $200,381
11,454,213
1386,093
1586,093
$14,100,815
$9A05,029
$4,4g5,785
$14,100,815
s0
TOTAL COST COST PER SF.
(Rentable)
$2,95,040 $2935
$13,49 10.13
$220,00 1220
$3,168,509 $31b9
1000
86,400,000 $6400$440,000 14.40$252,000 $252
89092,000 $90.92s0
$20,100
$160,000
$3,000
1286,381
$504,481
t0
s0
$504,481
$550,000
$15,000
$20000$190,000
$60,599
$70,000
$206,381$152,333
$18,000
$2060,81
11,958,093
1M50593
1=0093
514#95,29
TOTAL
110,109,510
14,495,785
114AM,295
1504,481
$504,481
1050
10.15
1030
$200$1.90
11.52101
126010.16
$1959
130
S14605
Yearl
USES
CDi
SOURCES
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APPENDIX D
120,000 SQUIARE FEET MIXED-USE BUILDING: DEVELOPMENT PRO FORMA
EXHIBIT 1: GENERAL INFORMATION AND ASSIIPTIONS
CONSTRUCTION FINANCING
Land (s.f.)
Gross Building Area (s.f.)
Floor Area Ratio
Office Net Rentable Area (s.f.)
Residential Net Rentable Area (s.f.)
Residential Units(*)
COST ASSUMPTIONS
Land (per surface s.tf)
Building Shill-Office (per gross s.f.)
Building ShIll & Finish-Residiper gs.f.).
Tenant Finish-Office (per rentable s.f.)
OFFICE:
Gross Rent
Operating Expense
Net Rent
RESIDENTIAL:
Monthly Gross Rent(per unit)
Monthly Operating Expense
as Percentage of Net Roevenue
16.000
120,000
7.5
70,000
30,000
30
Amount
Rate
Term (Months)
Ave. Outstanding
i 10,420,000
12.503
12
44X
PERMANENT FINANCING
Amount
Amortization
Mtge. Constant
Annual Debt Service
$183.44
162.00
$70.00
$14.87
S30.00
$7.00
$23.00
52,500.00
113,600,000
12.503
81,?00,000
*Interest only for first 5 years;
30-year amortization tlierafter
*12.81 constant
* Source: Institute of Real Estate Management. "Income
Expense Analysis, Apartments, Boston, Unfurnished
Elevator Buildings, 1982.
SPACE
k)
MARKET RENT
APPENDIX D
EMIBIT 2: USES AND SOUCES CF FUWS
Land
Land Purham Coat (%18144/s.f)
Land Title nsance
Land Development (Demolition)
TOTAL LA COT
Building & Improvement Costs
Building Selle $0.100 per &f.
TenentFinish e $14A7per s.f.
Alding SIell &Finih-Resid. o$70.00per a.f.
Other Constraction Costs.
Construction Contingency 93X
TOTAL BUILDING & IMPROVEMET COST
Indirect Costs 8efor. Financing:
A&E
Feesibility Studes
Advertising
Leesing Costs
Legal & Acountng
Title Inwance
Real Estate Taxes
Developers Fees
Financing Fees
Gener l/Adninistrative
Rent Concesasonem f cant Oer. Epenses
6enerel Contingency
TOTAL INDIRECT 00ST
Construction Interest 0 12.5
TOTAL CONSTRUCTION I4TEST
TOT AL PROJECT COSTS
TOTAL COST COST PER SF.
(Rentable)
12,935,040
$13,469
1220,000
$3,168,509
$5,206000
1208,180
$2,$20,000
440,000
$231,840
1608,020
1550,000
$15,000
19,900
$92,500
$152,000
50599
$70,000
211
1 $137,950
148,000
23 $259,30
s0
$832,720
1832,720
S20,100
326,000$38,000
$29,300
$40,000
$1,405,319 $1,047,200
179,612
179,612
$45,000
$45,800
$13,821,460 $1,925,779 10 115,747,239
Pennent Financing
Equity
TOTAL
$11 A74,221
$2,147,239 $1,925,779 113,00,000$2,147,239
$13,821,460 $1,925,779
Const. Yr. Yowl
USES
(A
12,935,040
$13,469
1220,000
13,168,509
15,208,000
SIp40,900
9440A0
1231,840
$2935$0.13
1220
131 9
0.00
15206
$10.41
$4.40
1232
10921
1650
10.15
1030
$4.19
11.90
10J5
10.70
$259
$136
10.16$403
1259
$25.13
1525
1525
$157.47
90JCES
1550,000$15,000$30,000
$419,300
$190,000
100,599
$70,000
1250,300
5137,900$18,000
9403,000
1259,300
$2,512,5?9
9025,412
1525,412
s0
TOTAL
$15,?4?,29
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